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3
SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA."
AGENT. See Banks any Banking.
BANKS AND BANKING.
Cashier-Agency-Liability of Bank.-Where a cashier of a bank,
acting as a special agent for a third party, purchases bonds for him, and
then, as agent of the bank, receives them as a special deposit, and after-
wards, to conceal certain embezzlements of his own, he, without the
knowledge of the depositor, transfers these bonds from the special de-
posit, and enters them as part of the assets of the bank, his agency for
the depositor ceases with the purchase. Throughout the remainder of
the transaction he is the agent of the bank, and his knowledge of the
depositor's rights is notice to the bank. The bank does not become a
purchaser for value without notice: Bank v. Dunbar, 118 Ill.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
Grant in Constitution of State not Repealable.-A grant in the con-
stitution of a state of a privilege to a corporation is not subject to
repeal or change by the legislature of a state: New Orleans v. Huston,
119 U. S.
CONTRACT.
Time of Performance, when not Excpressed-Time to Perform Act
which may Qualify or Change Rights and Duties of Parties.-W here a
party undertakes to do some particular act the performance of which
depends entirely upon himself, and the contract is silent as to the time
of performance, the law, without reference to extraordinary circum-
stances, will imply that it shall be performed within a reasonable time:
Hamilton v. Scully, 118 Ill.
Where a party has obligated himself to pay a given sum of money by
a future day, which is fixed as the time for full performance, and it is
agreed that the sum to be paid may be increased or diminished by the
performance of another act left to the option of the parties, the law will
require either party to exercise his option, and perform such act, before
full payment of the sum named is made. After full payment the party
will be held to have waived his right to do the act entitling him to a
further sum: Id.
3 From J. C. Bancroft Davis, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 119 U. S. Rep.
2 From Ron. N. L. Freeman, Reporter; to appear in 118 1ll. Rep.
3 From Joseph W. Spalding, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 78 Ale. Rep.
4 From Hon. Theo. T. Davidson, Reporter ; to appear in 95 N. C. Rep.
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The owner of a farm supposed to contain 4141 acres, sold the same
at $45 and $50 per acre, the purchase-money to be paid as follows :
$15,000 on the execution of the contract, $85.000 on the execution and
delivery of the deed by May 10th 1877, and the balance, $115,297.40,
on or before March 1st 1878, which was to be secured by note and
mortgage. It was further provided in the contract, that either party
might, at his own expense, survey the land, if he saw fit, to ascertain
the number of acres, and if such survey showed the land to contain
more acres than the parties supposed, the purchaser should pay the dif-
ference, and if it contained less, the amount of the deficit should be
deducted from the purchase-money or credited upon the note and mort-
gage. Some seven years after the date of the last payment the vendor
had a survey made, and brought suit against the purchaser for an excess
shown by the survey : Held, that he could not recover, the survey after
payment of the last instalment being too late: Id.
Trover.-An agreement acknowledging the possession of personal pro-
perty claimed by another and promising to "keep said property free
of expense" to the other, "and to deliver to him on demand such * * *
as I admit to be" his property, and to keep the balance " until such
time as the question of title is settled," will not prevent such other per-
son from maintaining trover for the same after .demand and refusal:
Buck v. Rich, 78 Me.
Logs with same .Mark-Trover- Conversion-Demand.-A. and H.
each owned a lot of logs of the same kind, quality and value, and bear-
ing the same mark. H. (and another party) contracted to saw A.'s logs
at the same mill where his own were to be manufactured. The logs
became intermixed without the fault of either party. Held, that A. was
entitled to his proportional part of the lumber manufactured from all
the logs, and that if H. converted to his own use more than his propor-
tional part of the lumber, he would be liable in trover for the same
without a special demand: Martin v. Mason, 78 Me.
CORPORATION.
Stockhoders-Dividends-Directors.-The Erie Railway Company,
being embarrassed and in the hands of a receiver, appointed in a suit
for the foreclosure of two of the mortgages upon the property of the
company, its creditors and its shareholders, preferred and common, en-
tered into an agreement for the reorganizhtion of the company, to be
accomplished by means of a foreclosure. Among other things it was
agreed that there should be issued " preferred stock, to an amount equal
to the preferred stock of the Erie Railway Company now outstanding,
to wit, $85,369 shares, of the nominal amount of $100 each, entitling
the holders to non-cumulative dividends, at the rate of six per cent. per
annum, in preference to the payment of any dividend on the common
stock, but dependent on the profits of each particular year as declared
by the board of directors." The mortgage was foreclosed, and a new
company was organized, and the new preferred stock was issued as
agreed. The directors of the new company reported- to its share and
bond holders that during and for the year ending September 30th 1880,
the operations of the road left a net profit of $1,790,620.71, which had
been applied to making double track, and other improvements on the
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property of the company. A., a preferred stockholder, on' behalf of
himself and other holders, filed a bill in equity to compel the company
to pay a dividend to the holders of preferred stock. Held, that while
the preferred stockholders are entitled to a six per cent. dividend in
advance of the common stockholders, they are not entitled, as of right,
to dividends, payable out of the net profits accruing in any particular
year, unless the directors declare or ought to declare a dividend payable
out of such profits; and that whether a dividend should be declared in
any year, is a matter belonging in the first instance to the directors, with
reference to the condition of the company's property and affairs as a
whole : N ew York, &c., Rd. v. Nichols, 119 U. S.
Railroads-Right to Remove all Things Growing within Lines of
Location.-A railroad corporation has practically the exclusive posses-
sion and contrbl of the land within the lines of its location and the
authority of removing therefrom all things growing thereon, the re-
moval of which it may deem necessarily conducive to the safe manage-
ment of'its road : Hayden, v. Skillings, 78 Me.
DAIAGES. See Waters and Water-courses.
To Real Estate- When Recoverable-Action for Injury to Land,
where not Transferable with the Land.-In an action brought for a de-
terioration in the value of real estate, occasioned by a nuisance of a per-
manent character, or which is treated as permanent by the parties, all
damages for the past and future injury of the property may be recov-
ered, and one recovery in such a case is a bar to all future actions for
the same cause: Rd. v. Loeb, 118 Ill.
Where private lots in a city are physically damaged, or injured in
value, by the construction and operation of a railroad in close proximity
thereto along a public street, the right of action, if any exists, is vested
in the owner of the lots immediately upon the construction of the rail-
road, to recover for all damages, past, present and future, and a subse-
quent grantee of the lots cannot maintain an action at all for the proper
use and operation of the road, after his purchase: Id.
Rights of Purchaser in respect to Subseguently Accruing Damages.-
While the purchaser of land cannot recover damages for an injury
thereto by the construction of a railroad over the same, or apart thereof,
before his purchase, yet if. the railway company, after his purchase,
adopts a new feature in the construction and operation of its road in the
future, as, by making an opening in an embankment for the passage of
water and constructing a bridge over the opening, such purchaser will,
in a proceeding to condemn, be entitled to just compensation for any
damages growing out of the change or alteration in the nature of the
work: Rd. v. McDougall, 118 Ill.
Railroad-Repair to Bridge- Obstruction to Yav(,ation-Damnum
Absque 11juria.-Whenever the exercise of a right, conferred by law
for the benefit of the public, is attended with temporary inconvenience
to private parties, in common with the public in general, they are not
entitled to damages therefor: Hamilton v. Vicksburg Rd., 119 U. S.
A railroad company was authorized by the Legislature of Louisiana
to construct a railroad across the state, and as part of such road to con-
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struct necessary bridges for crossing navigable streams. The act made
no provision for the form or character of such structures. A bridge
across a navigable stream was constructed with a draw. In process of
time it became decayed, and defendant in error, having succeeded to the
rights of the company, employed a contractor to construct a new bridge
in its place, the work to be done at a time of the year when it would
least obstruct navigation. The contractor complied with his contract as
to the time; but owing to unusual rains, the river continued navigable,
and the work was unavoidably prolonged, thereby obstructing its navi-
gation and preventing the vessels of plaintiff in error from passing be-
yond the bridge. Beld, That this was a case of damnum absque injuria.
Id.
DEED.
Boundary-Natural Objects.-As a general rule, natural objects
called for in a deed will govern course and distance, but there are ex-
ceptions to the rule, one of which is, where it can be proved that a line
was actually run and marked and a corner made, such line will be taken
as the true oue, although the deed called for a natural object, not reached
by such line: Baxter v. Wilson, 95 N. 0.
Ordinarily, the number of acres contained in a deed constitutes no
part of the description, but where the description is doubtful, it may
have weight as a circumstance in aid of the description, and in some
cases, in the absence of other definite descriptions, it may have a control-
ling effect: Id.
EQUITY. See Patent.
EVIDENCE.
aross-Exanznation.-The rule is, that the cross-examination of a wit-
ness shall be restricted to such matters and things as he may have been
examined upon in his direct examination: Hanchett v. K.imbark, 118
Ill.
But greater latitude is allowed on cross-examination, when the witness
is one of the parties in interest, or an unwilling witness, than in the case
of an ordinary witness. It is a matter of discretion to allow a wider
range to the cross-examination of a party, and not confine it strictly to
the matters elicited on the direct examination, and its exercise cannot be
assigned for error unless such discretion has been abused : Id.
So where the court allowed a witness, who was a party to the suit, in
his cross-examination, to be interrogated upon other subjects than those
he testified about in his direct examination, and it did not appear that
any injury resulted therefrom, it was held no ground to reverse the
judgment: Id.
INSURANCE.
Evidence to Rebut 2egligence of Assured.-In an action on a policy
of insurance for a loss by fire, if a point in the defence is made that the
property, or some part thereof, was lost by the neglect of the assured
to use his best endeavors to save the same, which is made a bar to a
recovery, evidence to rebut this theory, as, that other property of the
assured was destroyed, is proper; but if not material for such purpose,
its admission, when no recovery is sought for such other property, can
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work no injury, and is no ground for a reversal: Ins. Co. v. La Pointe
118 Ill.
Insurable Interest- Who entitled to Insurance Money as between Vendor
and Vendee, or Mortgagor and Aortgagee.-One in the possession of pro-
perty under a contract of purchase, who has made a partial payment
thereon, has such an equitable interest therein as to uphold an insurance
of the same against loss by fire: Grange .Aill Co. v. Western Assurance
Co., 118 Ill.
As between the vendee and vendor, the insurance money, incase of
the destruction of the property, represents the property itself, and in
equity the insurance money should be appropriated to the vendor, to
the extent of the unpaid purchase-money, in case of the insolvency of
the vendee: Id.
Where a mortgagor or vendee agrees to insure for the benefit of the
mortgagee or vendor, in equity such mortgagee or vendor will be enti-
tled to the insurance money in case of a loss, to the extent, at least, of
the interest of the mortgagor or vendee in the property insured; and
after notice to the insurance company having the risk, it cannot pay the
loss to the assured, except at its peril, until the rights of such mort-
gagee or vendor shall have been adjusted : Id.
Marine-.7nsurance by one Owner for Himself and other Owners-
Action.-Where. one owner of a vessel agrees to procure insurance for
two or more other owners, and does procure insurance on their part with
his in one policy, and collects on that policy for a loss, such of the other
owners, whose portion of the vessel was covered by that policy, may
maintain an action for his proportional part of the insurance money thus
collected : Gray v. Buck, 78 Me.
MASTER AND SERVANT. See Negligence; Patent.
Fellow-Servants, who are - Vontributory -Negligence. - While A.,
a longshoreman in the employ of a steamship company, was engaged
in his regular work, a tub filled with coal fell upon him and injured
him seriously. The fall was caused by the breaking of a rope
which suspended the tub. A. sued the company to recover damages,
claiming that the injury was caused by the negligence of B. in not pro-
viding a proper rope to hold the tub after notice of the insufficiency and
weakness of the one which broke, and that B. was an agent of the com-
pany, for whose acts or omissions it was responsible. The company de-
fended, setting up (1) contributory negligence in A.; and (2) that B.
was a fellow-servant of A., for whose acts or omissions the company was
not responsible. The judge who presided at the trial, refused tp direct
a verdict for the company, and referred the question of contributory
negligence to the jury; and also referred to them the question as to
what the authority of B. was. There were various exceptions by the
company to the charge, and to refusals to charge. A verdict was ren-
dered in favor of A., and judgment entered on the verdict. This court
affirms that judgment by a divided court: Ginard Steamship Co. v.
Carey, 119 U. S.
M1ORTGAGE.
Payment.-When a mortgagee, wbo holds two mortgages, one of real
and the other of personal estate, to secure the payment of the same
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debt, forecloses the personal mortgage, takes possession of the property
and converts it to his own use, if its value exceeds the debt secured, it
operates as a payment or satisfaction of it. There is no longer an exist-
ing debt to uphold the real mortgage: Bank v. .AfcKenney, 78 Me.
NEGLIGENCE. See Insurance; Master and Servant.
Master and Servant--Exposing the Latter to Poisonous Gases-
Proper Care on Part of Servant-Instruction.-Where a gas company,
by negligence, permits the escape of poisonous gases into a room not
properly arranged so as to let it pass out, and knows of such escape and
the danger of inhaling the same, and either the company, or its super-
intendent, duly authorized to employ and discharge, manage, direct and
control its employees or wbrkmen, orders a servant to do certain work
in such room, and the servant, in obedience to such order, without
knowledge of the danger to which he is exposed, and without fault or
negligence on his part, undertakes to do the work, and is overcome by
the gas so escaping, whereby he falls and receives an injury, from which
he dies, the company will become liable to the personal representative
of such deceased servant, in damages, for his death: Citizens' Gas Light
Co. v. O'Brien, 118 Ill.
In such case, on the trial of a suit brought by the administrator of
the deceased servant, the court instructed the jury, that if they believed;
from the evidence, that the defendant company and its superintendent
had knowledge of the danger of the service requized, and that the ser-
vant, without such knowledge, or any ihult or negligence, but in obey-
ing the order of the superintendent, inhaled said gas, which caused his
death, to find for the plaintiff: Hfeld, That while the use of the disjunc-
tive " or," was not grammatical or proper, it was not such an error as to
call for a reversal, especially where the instructions, as a whole, were
more favorable to the defendant than it could ask: Id.
NOTICE.
As to the Character of Possession required to Operate as Notice of
Occupant's Rights-Delay in filing Bill in Equity.-A widow furnished
her bachelor brother with $1600, with which, together with $500
advanced by him, to buy a farm for their joint use, the title to be taken
to each in proportion to the sums advanced by them, respectively. He,
however, took a conveyance of the entire estate to himself, and they both
moved upon the place in 1869, he managing the land, and she attending
to the household duties. The deed was recorded, anil he borrowed
money and had mortgaged the land to secure the loan, and appeared to
the world as the owner for a period of over ten years, during which time
the sister took no steps to have her equitable rights enforced or asserted:
.Held, that her possession under such circumstances was not such a pos-
session as would charge a purchaser or subsequent encumbrancer from
her brother with notice of her equitable rights: Harris v. McIntyre,
118 Ill.
In this case it appeared that the widow reposed great confidence in her
brother, which he shamefully abused, and it appeared that she remained
upon the place all the time, in the belief that she owned the greater interest
in the same, until in 1881, when she filed her bill to have a resulting trust
declared, and to set aside a conveyance made by her brother to one having
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notice of her equities, and for partition. It was held, that she was not
barred of relief by her delay in filing the bill, it clearly appearing that
she was kept in ignorance of the fraud practiced upon her until shortly
before filing her bill, and that there was no possession hostile to her
rights: Id.
PATENT.
Right of Afaster in Patent of Employee-Tansfer byMaster-Eguity.
-In a suit in equity by the trustees of a dissolved Missouri corporation
to compel an employee of the corporation to convey to the plaintiffs the
title to letters-patent obtained by him for an invention made while he
was in their employ, it not appearing, from the facts set forth in the bill,
that there was any agreement between the employee and the corporation,
that it was to have the title to the invention, or to any patent he might
obtain for it, it was held, on demurrer, that the bill could not be sus-
tained: lapgood v. Hewitt, 119 U. S.
Although the dissolved corporation assigned its right in the premises
to an Illinois corporation organized by the stockholders of the former,
whatever im'plied license the former had to use the invention was con-
fined to it, and was not assignable : Id.
The employee could bring no suit for infringement against the Mis-
souri corporation, for it was dissolved ; nor any suit in equity against its
trustees for an infringement, for they were not alleged to be using the
invention; and a suit at law against the trustees, or the stockholders, of
the Missouri corporation, for infringement by it, could not be enjoined,
because the theory of the bill was that there was a perfect defence 'to
such a suit: 1d.
PLEDGE.
Af1oney Bad and Received-Set-off.-Money received by the pledgee,
from the legal sale of a pledge, becomes his own, to the extent of his
debt; and he holds the balance, as " money had and received" for the
pledgor's use : .Fletcher v. Harmon, 78 Me.
Money received by the pledgee, from the illegal sale of a pledge, the
pledgor, by waiving the tort, may require to be applied in payment of
his debt, and the pledgee would hold any balance, as money had and
received for the pledgor's use : Id.
Money so held may be recovered in assumpsit, or by set-off: Id.
The value of securities in pledge, tortiously dealt with by the pledgee,
unless reduced to money or its equivalent, cannot be recovered in as-
sumpsit, as money "had and received," nor by set off: Id.
The contract, touching a pledge to secure a debt, is collateral ; ald
damages for its breach cannot be allowed by way of recoupment, in
defence of a suit to recover the debt : Id.
RAILROAD. See Corporation.
SURETY.
Collectors of Taxes-Appropriation of Deficiency.-The same person
was collector of taxes in a town for three years in succession, when there
appeared a deficiency in his accounts. There was no evidence showing
the time when the deficit commenced, or when it occurred, or if any
appropriation of payments by him to the town, either by the collector
or the town. He gave a bond each year. Held, That the deficit should
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be divided between the three bonds in the proportion of the sums
collected by the collector on each commitment: Pkipsburg v. Dickinson,
78 Me.
TAX.
When on Corporaton.-An assessment of a tax upon the shares of
shareholders in a corporation appearing upon the books of the company,
which the company is required to pay irrespective of any dividends or
profits payable to the shareholder, out of which it might repay itself, is
substantially a tax upon the corporation itself: New Orleans v. Jouston,
119 U. S.
TROVER. See Corporation.
WATERS AND WATER-COURSES. See Damages.
nnavigable Stream- lce-Damages.-The owner of a mill-dam on
an unnavigable stream, who does not own the bed of the stream above
the dam, has a qualified interest in the water flowed but none in the ice
formed upon it: Stevens v. Kelley, 78 le.
The riparian owner is the owner of the ice in such case, though the
ice privilege is made by the flowage: Id.
Where the owner of such a mill-dam maliciously and unnecessarily
draws the water from the pond and thus destroys the ice field, he is lia-
ble in damages to the riparian owner who owned the land under the
pond: Id.
WILL. See Executors and Administrators.
WFhe an Interest or JEstate becomes Vested.-A testator directed that
all his estate, real and personal, be converted into money, and devised
to each of the four children of his sister P., (naming them), one share,
and to her two grand-children each a half share, and in case of the death
of either of said four children, then to the widow of such deceased, and
in like manner one share to each of the children (naming them) of his
brothers and another sister, and three shares to his half-brother, and
then directed, that " in the event of the death of any one named above,
then the portion or share of the deceased to be paid to his or her off-
spring, and if no offspring" was left, his part to lapse. Thirteen days
after the death of the testator one of the sons of P. died, leaving chil-
dren, and his administrator claimed his share of thp estate : Held, that
the son of P. did not take a vested interest immediately upon the death
of the testator, and that the share of such son went to his heirs: Banta
v. Boyd, 118 Ill.
In such case the property of the testator was not devised, but only its
proceeds when converted into money, and the persons named took no
vested interest before the arrival of the time for distribution. In case
of the death of anyone before the conversion of the estate into money
and the period for distribution had arrived, his or her part went to his
or her children, if any, and if no children, his share lapsed, thereby in-
creasing the other shares : Id.
